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Abstract 
Past research on power focused exclusively on declarative knowledge, and neglected the 
role of subjective experiences.  Five studies tested the hypothesis that power increases 
reliance on the experienced ease or difficulty that accompanies thought generation.  
Across a variety of targets such as attitudes, leisure-time satisfaction, and stereotyping, 
and using different operationalizations of power including priming, trait-dominance, and 
actual power in managerial contexts, power consistently increased reliance on the ease of 
retrieval.  These effects remained one week later, and were not mediated by mood, quality 
of the retrieved information, or number of counter-arguments.  These findings indicate 
that powerful individuals construe their judgments based on momentary subjective 
experiences, and do not necessarily rely on core attitudes or prior knowledge such as 
stereotypes.   
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I don't spend a lot of time taking polls around the world to tell me what I think is the right 
way to act.  I just got to know how I feel.   
-- George W.  Bush, US president (Nov.  2002) 
Individual and collective outcomes are to a great extent the result of judgments 
and decisions made by powerful actors.  Political leaders embark on wars, executives 
define organizational objectives, teachers evaluate students, doctors prescribe treatments, 
and parents make family decisions.  In short, powerful roles require individuals to make 
judgments and decisions with important implications for others.  Anecdotal evidence, 
such as George Bush’s comment, would suggest that feelings play an important role in the 
judgments made by powerful actors.  However, past research on power focused 
exclusively on the declarative content that formed the basis for powerful individuals’ 
judgments.  Accompanying subjective experiences were not considered.  The present 
article rectifies this neglect proposing that power promotes reliance on experience-based 
information.   
Human reasoning is accompanied by subjective experiences, such as affective 
feelings (e.g., sadness, fear), bodily sensations (e.g., hunger, fatigue), and feelings that 
accompany thought processes (e.g., ease of retrieving mental contents, feeling of 
familiarity; see Schwarz & Clore, 1996).  Subjective experiences derive from perceptual 
systems and sensations that arise while individuals process information, form judgments, 
and engage in action (Strack, 1992; see also Kahneman, 2003).  These experiences are a 
source of information, and such experiential information is often used to guide judgments 
and behavior (e.g. Schwarz, 2004; Schwarz & Clore, 1996; Schwarz & Vaughn, 2002; 
Strack, 1992).  For example, the feeling of familiarity informs us that we have 
encountered a given stimulus before; the feeling of guilt can be used to judge the 
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appropriateness of our ongoing actions; or the feeling of difficulty in retrieving exemplars 
can inform us about the frequency of an event.   
In the present article we propose that power promotes reliance on experiential 
information.  Our proposal derives from research indicating that subjective experiences 
are a primary aspect that drives cognition (see Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Frederick, 
2002; Strack, 1992; Whittelsea & Williams, 1998), and power induces a simplified 
processing orientation that focuses on single sources of information (Guinote, 2007-a; 
2007-b; see also Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003).  We will 
first briefly describe the role of experiential information in the construction of judgments.  
Then we will discuss the ways powerful and powerless individuals rely on experiential 
information using the ease of retrieval paradigm (Schwarz, Bless, Strack, Klumpp, 
Rittenauer-Schatka, & Simons, 1991).   
Declarative vs. Experiential Information 
Broadly speaking human judgments can draw on two distinct sources of 
information: declarative information that pertains to features of a target, and experiences 
or feelings that occur during the judgmental process.  At present a considerable body of 
research demonstrates that a full account of human judgments requires a consideration of 
both sources of information (e.g., Bless & Forgas, 2000; Schwarz, 1998).   
This becomes particularly evident by looking at the feeling of difficulty or ease 
that emerges from the retrieval of mental contents (e.g., Schwarz et al., 1991).  When 
retrieving information about an object is easy individuals tend to perceive the target object 
in line with the implications that derive from their thought contents.  However, when 
retrieving information is difficult individuals interpret this experience as a limitation or 
restriction, and their judgments tend to contradict the content of their thoughts.  For 
example, a person may conclude from the difficulty in thinking of many reasons to accept 
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an offer for a new post that it is better to stay in the current job.  Ease of retrieval thus 
provides experiential information that qualifies and may even reverse the implications of 
declarative thought contents (e.g., in spite of having good reasons to aim for the new post 
the person may conclude ‘If it’s so difficult to think of many reasons to accept the new 
post it may not be worth accepting it’; see Schwarz, 1998).   
Tversky and Kahneman (1973) were the first to point out the role of ease of 
retrieval experiences in the judgmental domain.  A new interest was sparked, however, 
with the creation of a research design that allows a separation of the effects of experienced 
ease and declarative thought contents.  Schwarz and colleagues (1991) asked participants 
to list either a few (an easy task) or many (a difficult task) past instances indicative of 
assertiveness.  Participants subsequently rated themselves as more assertive when they 
had experienced ease rather than difficulty in the retrieval process.  Since judgments based 
on the mere declarative content are likely to result in the opposite pattern, with higher 
ratings of assertiveness after retrieving many rather than few behavioral examples, it was 
concluded that participants’ judgments were guided by experiential information.   
The ease of retrieval paradigm has the unique feature of being able to elicit 
experiential information that is at odds with declarative thought contents.  It has been used 
in a variety of domains to separate the relative contribution of experience-based- and 
content-based information, including in social perception (Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 1999; 
Raghubir & Menon, 2005), attitudes (Menon & Raghubir, 2003; Wänke & Bless, 2000; 
Wänke, Bohner & Jurkowitsch, 1997), and autobiographic knowledge (Winkielman & 
Schwarz, 2001; see also Winkielman, Schwarz, & Bellig, 1998).  In the present article we 
focus on ease of retrieval with the purpose of separating the relative contribution of 
experience-based- and content-based information in the judgments of powerful and 
powerless individuals.    
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Power and Ease of Retrieval 
Power refers to the ability to control others’ outcomes (Thibaut & Kelley, 1959) 
and to influence others at will (Cartwright, 1947).  Powerful individuals have greater 
predictability and control and are less dependent on external circumstances (Hollander, 
1958; Lewin, 1947).  According to the Situated Focus Theory of Power (Guinote, in 
press), powerful individuals are free to process information more selectively in line with 
the factors that drive cognition in the situation (e.g., expectancies, goals, affordances, 
bodily sensations).  Conversely, powerless individuals are attentive to multiple sources of 
information and interpret information beyond its face value in order to increase 
predictability and control (Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Goodwin, Gubin, Fiske, & Yzerbyt, 
2000; Guinote, 2004; Guinote, 2007-a; Guinote, Brown, & Fiske, 2006; Keltner et al., 
2003).  For instance, studies on persuasion show that control deprived individuals turn to 
the message content for additional information (Pittman, 1993; see also Guinote et al., 
2006). In contrast, elevated power increases the tendency to focus on single cues 
(Guinote, in press), and reduces the tendency to take additional perspectives into account 
(e.g, Galinsky, Magee, & Inesi, & Gruenfeld, 2006; Mannix & Neale, 1993).   
Subjective experiences, such as the ease of retrieval, are primary cues that can 
drive the online-construction of judgments both automatically and deliberately (see 
Kahneman, 2003; Kahneman & Frederick, 2002; Menon & Raghubir, 2003; Strack, 1992; 
Whittelsea & Williams, 1998; see also Pam, Cohen, Pracejus & Hughes, 2001).  The 
greater tendency of powerful individuals to rely on the primary factors that drive 
cognition and ignore additional information should, therefore, promote experience-based 
responses.  In contrast, the greater tendency of powerless individuals to engage in 
interpretative reasoning and go beyond accessible impressions should decrease the impact 
of subjective experiences and strengthen content-based processing.  One would, therefore, 
 Power and Subjective Experiences 7 
 
 
expect powerful individuals to rely on the ease of retrieval and powerless individuals to 
rely on activated declarative contents.   
Indirect support for this claim is offered by research suggesting that powerful 
individuals respond more in line with their feelings (e.g., Guinote, 2007-c; Hecht & 
LaFrance, 1998).  For example, in a study that involved eating appetizing and non-
appetizing food, powerful participants ate more or less food as a function of their 
gustatory experiences while eating (Guinote, 2007-c).  In contrast, the amount of food 
eaten by powerless individuals was unrelated to their experiences.  Guinote (2007-a) also 
found that powerful individuals were more prone to magnify the expression of unwanted 
thoughts after suppressing these thoughts compared to powerless individuals.  This 
increased rebound of unwanted thoughts after suppression indicates that powerful 
individuals, more than powerless individuals, used the experienced difficulties in 
suppressing unwanted thoughts as a source of information (see Förster & Liberman, 2001; 
Förster & Liberman, 2004).   
Although these studies are suggestive, the role of subjective experiences remains 
largely unexplored.  In particular, prior research did not separate experiential information 
from declarative thought contents.  For example, ease of processing stereotype-consistent 
information, rather than the content of this information per se, could contribute to greater 
stereotyping in the social perception of powerful and powerless individuals.  
Consequently, experiential and declarative information remain confounded in most 
research on power.  Moreover, prior studies focused on domains that do not have strong 
declarative components, such as smiling in interaction contexts (Hecht & LaFrance, 1998) 
or eating (Guinote, 2007-c).  It is possible that the greater tendency of powerful 
individuals to rely on experiences does not hold when one can resort to declarative 
information.  In the present article we hypothesize that power induces reliance on 
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subjective experiences also in a context where responses can be based on declarative 
thought contents.  This perspective implies that the judgments of powerful individuals are 
malleable and subject to influences of momentary experiences. 
Subjective Experiences and Temporal Stability 
Although the present research emphasizes momentary influences on attitudes and 
the greater variability in judgments that results from the experience of power (see also 
Guinote, 2004; Guinote, Judd, & Brauer, 2002), we think that this does not preclude 
temporal stability of attitudes.  Under certain circumstances powerful individuals may rely 
on evaluative judgments previously stored in memory (see Judd & Brauer, 1995), in 
particular when previously formed attitudes are accessible at the time of judgment 
(Bohner & Wänke, 2002).  This would reconcile the present perspective with past 
research showing that powerful individuals can respond more in line with stable personal 
tendencies or prior knowledge structures (e.g., Chen, Lee-Chai, & Bargh, 2001; Fiske & 
Dépret, 1996). The present article explores the possibility that powerful individuals’ past 
attitude-judgments, construed on the basis of experiential information, can affect 
judgments at later points in time.  We reasoned that when individuals make judgments 
based on ease of retrieval these judgments are stored in memory, perhaps together with 
information on retrieval experiences (see Barsalou, 1999).  Subsequent attitudinal 
judgments can be based in part on these sources of information, thereby contributing to 
some temporal stability.   One goal of the present research is to provide, as far as we know 
for the first time, evidence that reliance on ease of retrieval can have long-term effects.  
We examine this effect in the context of power, illustrating how momentary influences 
can transpire over time and promote some stability in the judgments of powerful 
individuals.   
The Present Research 
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The primary goal of the present article is to demonstrate that powerful individuals 
rely on experiential information, whereas powerless individuals draw their judgments on 
declarative thought content.  This hypothesis was tested in five studies using the ease of 
retrieval paradigm (Schwarz et al., 1991).  These studies examined reliance on ease of 
retrieval experiences in domains that have been associated with judgmental stability and 
the expression of core values and attitudes in powerful individuals, such as stereotyping 
and self-related judgments. Power was operationalized through priming, trait dominance, 
and actual professional roles (i.e., managers vs. subordinates).  We also examined whether 
the effects of power on reliance on ease of retrieval can be explained by other factors such 
as mood, quality of the retrieved information, number of counter-attitudinal thoughts, or 
differences in the subjective experience itself.  In addition, Study 4 used a longitudinal 
design to test the prediction that reliance on the ease of retrieval can have long-term 
effects.   
 Study 1a: Evaluative Judgments in Unfamiliar Domains 
The present study tests the hypothesis that power induces reliance on the ease of 
retrieval in the realm of attitude judgments.  Power was primed by asking participants to 
report a past event in which they had power over someone, or someone had power over 
them (Galinsky, Gruenfeld, & Magee, 2003).  Participants were then provided with a 
news report that dealt with plans of NASA to send humans to Mars.  In the following we 
asked participants to generate either a small number or a large number of arguments in 
favor of sending humans to Mars.   
If powerful individuals rely more on subjective experiences they should use the 
ease or difficulty in generating arguments as a source of information to guide their attitude 
judgments.  That is, powerful individuals should be more in favor of sending humans to 
Mars after generating few as opposed to many arguments.  Conversely, if powerless 
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individuals have a more complex processing orientation they should be less affected by 
the ease of retrieval and focus more on the content of their thoughts.  Thus, the attitudes of 
powerless individuals should be equally favorable after generating few or many 
arguments, or be even more positive after generating many compared to few arguments.1 
Method 
Participants and Design 
One hundred and thirty-six students (78 females and 57 males)2 from the 
University of Kent participated for entry in a lottery.  Up to five participants took part in 
one session.  They were randomly assigned to the conditions of a 2 (power: powerful vs. 
powerless) x 2 (number of arguments: few vs. many arguments) between-subjects 
factorial design. 
Procedure and Materials 
Participants were informed that they would work on two independent studies about 
situational perception and decision-making.  They received a booklet that consisted of two 
separate questionnaires.  The first questionnaire contained the power manipulation and a 
measure of mood.  Following Galinsky et al.  (2003) participants were asked to provide a 
vivid written report of either a past event where they had power over another individual, 
or someone else had power over them.  Participants were given an answer-sheet with 35 
lines to complete this task.  Following the manipulation of power a single item assessed 
participants’ mood on a scale ranging from very sad (1) to very happy (10).3  The second 
questionnaire included a manipulation of ease of retrieval.  Participants were asked to read 
the following scenario extracted from a news report that dealt with the endeavor of 
sending humans to Mars: 
On January 14, 2004, a new course of human exploration of the solar system was 
charted.  A “Commission on Implementation of Space Exploration" was created.  
The Commission will generate a report for NASA this summer, and it is 
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expected that the endeavor of sending humans to Mars will play a prominent role 
in this report. 
 
After reading this background information participants were asked to generate 
either two arguments, or six arguments in favor of this enterprise.  The ease of retrieval 
paradigm rests on the assumption that listing only few arguments is perceived as easy, 
whereas listing many arguments is perceived as difficult (Schwarz et al., 1991).  Thus, a 
pretest was carried out where we asked participants (N = 10) to generate a free number of 
arguments in favor of sending humans to Mars (M = 3.60, SD = 0.89).  Based on this 
pretest we concluded that listing two arguments is perceived as easy, whereas generating 
six arguments is perceived as difficult (see Ruder & Bless, 2003).  Participants in the main 
study received an answer-sheet that provided three lines for each argument.  There were 
no time restrictions and participants completed this task at their own pace.  Following the 
generation of arguments participants rated their attitudes towards sending humans to Mars 
on a 10-point scale ranging from negative (1) to positive (10).  They also indicated how 
much they would welcome such an enterprise on a scale ranging from not at all (1) to very 
much (10).  After completion of the booklet participants were thanked and debriefed. 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Checks 
After the written report of a past instance participants indicated on a 9-point scale 
(ranging from not at all to very much) how much they felt in charge in the situation they 
described in their essay.  An independent-samples t-test revealed that participants in the 
powerful condition felt more in charge of the situation than participants in the powerless 
condition (Ms = 7.34 vs. 2.61), t(134) = -20.27, p < .001.  This result indicates that the 
manipulation was successful in inducing instances where participants felt powerful or 
powerless.   
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Participants also rated how difficult it was to generate the requested number of 
arguments on a scale ranging from not at all difficult (1) to very difficult (10).  A 2 
(power: powerful vs. powerless) x 2 (number of arguments: few vs. many arguments) 
between subjects analysis of variance was conducted on this measure.  As expected, 
generating two arguments was perceived easier than generating six arguments (Ms= 4.14 
vs. 6.44), F(1, 132) = 26.91, p < .001, which demonstrates the effectiveness of the ease of 
retrieval manipulation.  No other effects were significant, ps ≥ .16.  Ease of retrieval 
experiences were, therefore, not affected by our priming manipulation of power.   
Attitudes 
The two attitude measures designed to assess participants’ attitudes towards 
sending humans to Mars were highly correlated (α = .95, M = 5.76, SD = 2.51) and 
therefore collapsed into a single attitude score.  This score was subjected to a 2 (power: 
powerful vs. powerless) x 2 (number of arguments: two vs. six arguments) between 
subjects analysis of variance.  This analysis yielded a main effect of number of arguments, 
indicating a more favorable opinion after generating two, as opposed to six arguments 
(Ms= 6.34 vs. 5.15), F(1, 132) = 8.91, p = .003.  This result points out the importance of 
ease of retrieval experiences, which affected participants’ judgments more than did the 
content of the information they retrieved.  When generating arguments was easy, 
participants had a more favorable attitude compared to when generating arguments was 
difficult.  Of special importance, this main effect was qualified by a significant interaction 
between power and number of arguments, F(1, 132) = 4.06, p = .046.  As expected, 
participants in the powerful condition were more affected by ease of retrieval compared to 
participants in the powerless condition (Table 1).  Powerful participants were more in 
favor of sending humans to Mars after having generated few compared to many 
arguments (Ms = 4.88 vs. 6.97), F(1,132) = 11.47, p < .001.  In contrast, participants in 
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the powerless condition were unaffected by the ease or difficulty in generating arguments 
(Ms = 5.77 vs. 5.36), F< 1.  The main effect of power was not significant, F<1.   
Mood 
An independent-samples t-test indicated that power did not affect participants’ 
mood, (Ms= 6.47 vs. 6.42), t(135) = -.09, p = .931.  The impact of power on ease of 
retrieval was, therefore, not mediated by differences in mood.   
Taken together these results provide initial evidence for the hypothesis that power 
promotes reliance on the ease of retrieval.  The attitudes of participants primed with 
power seemed to be affected by the experience of ease or difficulty in retrieving thought 
contents.  No such effect was evident for participants primed with powerlessness.   
Still, although the results seem to indicate that ease of retrieval was the key factor 
affecting powerful individuals’ attitudes, the results could be explained by differences in 
the content of the information retrieved rather than the use of experiential information.  In 
particular, powerful individuals, unlike powerless individuals, may have generated more 
persuasive arguments when asked to generate few compared to many arguments, and this 
could have affected their responses.  The original paradigm developed by Schwarz and 
colleagues does not rule out this possibility (see Ruder & Bless, 2003; Wänke, Bless, & 
Biller, 1996).  We conducted a subsequent study to address this issue. 
Study 1b: The Role of Persuasiveness 
The purpose of the present study was to rule out the possibility that differences in 
the persuasiveness of the retrieved information account for the effects observed in Study 
1a.  To this end a yoked design was employed (see Ruder & Bless, 2003; Wänke et al., 
1996).  The arguments generated in Study 1a were presented to another sample of 
participants.  Specifically, each ‘writer’ of Study 1a was matched with one ‘reader’ of the 
same sex in Study 1b.  After reading the arguments of a writer, participants expressed 
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their own attitudes regarding the dispatch of humans to Mars.  They also evaluated the 
quality of the arguments.         
Since readers have only access to the content and not to the subjective experiences 
associated with the generation of the arguments, their attitudes should reflect the 
arguments’ persuasive content.  Thus, if power-primed writers relied on the experienced 
ease of generating arguments only writers, but not readers, should have more favorable 
attitudes in the few- compared to the many-arguments condition.  Conversely, if 
powerlessness-primed writers based their judgments on the content of the retrieved 
information their attitudes should be analogous to their corresponding readers’ attitudes.   
Method 
Participants and Design 
One hundred and thirty-six students from the University of Kent (79 females and 
58 males) participated on a voluntary basis.  Participants were presented with the 
arguments of a same-sex writer of Study 1a.  As a result this study used a 2 (power: 
powerful vs. powerless) x 2 (number of arguments: few vs. many arguments) x 2 (source: 
writer vs. reader) mixed factor yoked design, with power and number of arguments as 
between-subjects factors.   
Procedure and Materials 
Participants took part in groups of up to five participants.  First they read the same 
background information presented to the writers of Study 1a.  Then each participant was 
presented with the arguments generated by one writer of Study 1a.  Participants were 
instructed to read the arguments carefully in order to provide an objective interpretation of 
this information.  After having read the arguments participants completed the same 
attitude measures as participants in Study 1a.  Finally, participants rated the quality and 
the persuasiveness of the total number of arguments generated by each participant on two 
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10-point scales ranging from 1 (not at all persuasive; very bad) to 10 (very persuasive; 
very good).  Participants were then thanked and debriefed.   
Results and Discussion 
The readers’ scores on the two attitude measures were averaged into a single index 
(α = .89, M = 6.31, SD = 2.19).  To test the hypothesis that readers’ attitudes differ from 
the attitudes of writers primed with power but not from the attitudes of writers primed 
with powerlessness, we submitted this score to a 2 (power: powerful vs. powerless) x 2 
(number of arguments: few vs. many arguments) x 2 (source: writer vs. reader) mixed 
analysis of variance.  Writers versus readers were treated as a within-subjects factor.  The 
analysis yielded a main effect of source, F(1, 132) = 4.20, p = .043, indicating that readers 
had a more favorable attitude towards sending humans to Mars than writers (Ms = 6.31 vs.  
5.75).  Readers’ attitudes may have been affected by the fact that another student (i.e. the 
corresponding writer) generated unequivocally supportive arguments in favor of sending 
humans to Mars.  As expected, the interaction between source and number of arguments 
was also significant, F(1, 132) = 5.33, p = .023.  Participants in Study 1a reported a more 
favorable attitude after generating a few rather than many arguments (Ms = 6.34 vs. 5.15), 
F(1,132) = 8.91, p = .003, however, no such difference was evident for the readers (Ms = 
6.30 vs. 6.32), F < 1 (Table 1).  This relationship was further qualified by a marginally 
significant interaction between power, number of arguments and source, F(1, 132) = 2.87, 
p = .093.4  While powerful writers had reported a more favorable attitude towards sending 
humans to Mars after generating few as opposed to many arguments (Ms = 6.97 vs. 4.88), 
F(1, 132) = 11.47, p < .001, this difference was not evident for their readers (Ms = 6.27 
vs. 6.38), F < 1.  This pattern is reflected in a significant interaction between source and 
number of arguments for powerful writers and their readers, F(1, 132) = 7.34, p = .008.  In 
contrast, the attitudes of powerless writers and their readers did not vary as a function of 
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the number of arguments retrieved, (Mswriters = 5.77 vs. 5.36; Msreaders = 6.32 vs. 6.26), 
Fs < 1.  These results support the hypothesis that powerful writers based their attitudes on 
the ease of retrieval, whereas readers and powerless writers based their attitudes on the 
content of the information described.  No other reliable effects emerged, F<1. 
Argument Persuasiveness 
We averaged readers’ ratings of argument-persuasiveness and quality (α = .87, M 
= 5.51, SD = 1.94) and submitted this score to a 2 (power: powerful vs. powerless) x 2 
(number of arguments: few vs. many arguments) between subjects analysis of variance.  
The analysis revealed a main effect of power, F(1, 132) = 5.17, p = 025.  The arguments 
of powerful writers were rated higher in persuasiveness than the arguments of powerless 
writers (Ms = 5.56 vs. 4.82).  However, this effect did not vary as a function of the 
number of arguments (F < 1), providing additional support for the hypothesis that 
powerful individuals were primarily influenced by ease of retrieval experiences rather 
than by differences in the persuasiveness of the retrieved information.  Finally, there was 
also no reliable effect of number of arguments on perceived persuasiveness, p = .164.  
Overall, listing many arguments was not more persuasive than listing few arguments.  
This result is consistent with our interpretation that powerless individuals, who did not 
vary their attitudes as a function of the number of arguments in Study 1a, based their 
judgments on the content of the information retrieved.   
Taken together the results of Study 1b are consistent with our hypotheses.  Readers 
had only access to the informational content of the arguments but not to the experienced 
ease of retrieval.  Since the attitudes of readers, as well as their ratings of persuasiveness, 
did not differ as a function of the number of arguments, we can conclude that 
persuasiveness of the arguments generated by powerful and powerless participants in 
Study 1a could not account for the results obtained.  These results lend support to the 
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hypothesis that powerful writers were affected by the ease of retrieval, whereas powerless 
writers drew on the content of the retrieved information.   
Taken together the results of Study 1a and 1b support the hypothesis that power 
promotes reliance on ease of retrieval in the realm of attitude judgments.  A subsequent 
study was designed with the aim of extending these findings into a more familiar and 
involving domain: judgments related to the Self. 
Study 2: Self-related Judgments 
Past research has argued that power magnifies the expression of self-related 
attributes (Chen et al., 2001; Smith & Trope, 2006).  For example, power increases 
cooperative behavior for communal oriented participants and selfish behavior for 
exchange oriented participants (Chen et al., 2001).  From this perspective one would 
predict that judgments and behaviors related to the Self are more stable and less subject to 
momentary influences for powerful compared to powerless individuals.  Yet, if self-
related judgments are construed in the moment on the basis of subjective experiences, and 
powerful individuals respond more in line with the factors that drive cognition in the 
situation, then their self-related judgments might actually be more malleable than 
previously assumed.  The present study tests this hypothesis. 
One further contribution of the present study is to examine the ecological validity 
of our predictions using a sample of managers and subordinates.  There is surprisingly 
little evidence that effects obtained in the laboratory coincide with effects of power that 
take place in real-life.  To date socio-cognitive research on power has used only 
undergraduate students (for an exception see Guinote, 2007-d), which might be 
problematic considering that students have little experience with enacting powerful roles.   
In the present study managers and subordinates were asked to retrieve recent 
episodic instances about their lives before we assessed their self-perception.  Specifically, 
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they were asked to list either many or few episodic instances that had occurred during 
their leisure time in the two weeks preceding the assessment.  Following this task 
participants were asked to indicate how satisfied they were with the amount of leisure 
time at their disposal, as well as with their general work-life balance.  We expected 
managers to be more satisfied with their leisure time after generating few (a task that is 
perceived as easy) compared to many (a task that is perceived as difficult) past instances 
of leisure time.  Subordinates on the other hand should be unaffected by the ease of 
retrieval and base their judgments on the content of the retrieved information instead.   
Method 
Participants and Design 
Eighty-three full-time employees (44 managers and 39 subordinates) were 
approached at an international business airport.  Managers (9 females and 35 males) 
worked in a variety of businesses (e.g., IT, Banking, Automotive).  Nineteen managers 
(43.2%) occupied middle management and seventeen (38.7%) top management positions.5  
Importantly, all managers had subordinates under their supervision.  Twenty-three percent 
had 5 or fewer subordinates, 43% had 6 to 20 subordinates, and 29% were in charge of 
more than 20 subordinates.  The managers were aged between 21 and 60 years (M = 
40.14, SD = 9.08).  Care was taken to obtain a comparable sample of employees in 
subordinate positions (13 females and 26 males) working under the supervision of one or 
more managers.  Most subordinates (87.2%) were office-workers in clerical positions 
(e.g., Sales Executives, Advisors, Software Programmers).  Fourteen subordinates 
(43.6%) occupied senior positions and eleven subordinates (28.2%) occupied junior 
positions.  The subordinates were between 20 and 53 years old (M = 32.74, SD = 8.31) 
and none of them had personnel responsibilities. 
 Power and Subjective Experiences 19 
 
 
Participants were run individually and were randomly assigned to one of the two 
ease of retrieval conditions, thus creating a 2 (power: managers vs. subordinates) x 2 
(number of instances: few vs. many) factorial between subjects design.   
Procedure and Materials 
Participants were informed that the study dealt with the perception of work-life 
balance.  They received a short questionnaire that consisted of two pages.  On the first 
page participants were asked to indicate their current function and job-level.  Managers 
also indicated the number of subordinates working under their supervision. This was 
followed by the experimental manipulation of ease of retrieval.  Ease of retrieval was 
manipulated by asking participants to indicate two (easy) or ten (difficult) activities or 
events that they had experienced during the last two weeks in their leisure time, together 
with the time they spent on each activity.  The number of instances in each condition was 
based on a pre-test conducted with ten full-time employees, who were asked to list as 
many episodes of leisure time as they could think of (M = 7.40; SD = 3.13).  The 
definition of leisure time was included in the instructions, which read as follows:  
Balancing professional and private life plays a prominent role in well-being and in 
our general quality of life.  It is evident that work-life balance involves not only 
factors occurring at work, but also all activities/events outside work.  Time outside 
employment or education can be divided into necessary time (e.g.  personal care 
activities, sleeping, eating), committed time (pursuing social or other 
responsibilities – housework and domestic activities, child care, shopping, 
voluntary work, social commitments) and leisure time (time for yourself, not 
falling into the other categories).  In the following please list two (ten) distinct 
situations or events that you experienced within the last two weeks in your leisure 
time.  This means time for ‘yourself’ outside work that was not committed to any 
responsibilities.  Please describe the situation or event briefly.  In the right column 
please indicate how much time the situation or event took approximately (in 
hours). 
 
Participants completed the questionnaire at their own pace.  Following the 
manipulation of ease of retrieval they indicated on three 9-point scales how much they 
were happy with the amount of leisure time they had, whether their leisure time allowed 
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them to self-realize, and how much they were content with their current work-life balance.  
Participants’ mood was assessed using four 7-point scales ranging from –3 (very bad; very 
sad; very discontent; very tense) to 3 (very good; very happy, very content; very relaxed).  
Finally, participants also indicated their gender, age, weekly hours spent at work, and how 
many days they had been on holidays during the two weeks prior to completion of the 
questionnaire.  On completion participants were thanked and debriefed. 
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Check 
Participants indicated how easy it was for them to recall the leisure activities on a 
9-point scale.  This measure of experienced ease was subjected to a 2 (power: managers 
vs. subordinates) x 2 (number of instances: few vs. many instances) between subjects 
analysis of variance.  The results indicated that generating few instances was easier than 
generating many instances (Ms = 5.89 vs. 4.33), F(1,78) = 8.24, p = .005, confirming the 
effectiveness of the experimental manipulation.  No other reliable effect emerged (Fs<1), 
which suggests that managers and subordinates did not differ in the experienced ease of 
retrieval within the experimental conditions. 
Leisure Time Satisfaction 
First, we examined whether leisure time, indexed by the total number of hours 
participants spent in the activities reported, varied as a function of power (managers vs. 
subordinates) and number of instances recalled (few vs. many).  Participants retrieved 
more hours of leisure time when being asked to indicate many as opposed to few past 
instances (Ms = 34.82 vs. 13.65), F(1,79) = 19.93, p < .001.  No other effects emerged 
(Fs<1), which indicates that managers and subordinates did not differ in terms of actual 
amount of leisure time reported.6   
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We then collapsed the three measures of leisure time satisfaction into a single 
index (α = .84, M = 4.41, SD = 1.87), and submitted this score to a 2 (power: managers vs. 
subordinates) x 2 (number of instances: few vs. many) between subjects analysis of 
variance.  The analysis yielded the expected significant interaction between position and 
number of recalled instances, F(1, 79) = 7.48, p = .008.  As shown in Table 2, managers 
reported greater satisfaction after indicating a few rather than many leisure time activities 
(Ms = 4.95 vs. 3.82), F(1, 79) = 4.19, p = .044.  Subordinates showed the opposite 
tendency, as implied by the marginally significant trend to be more satisfied after having 
listed many as opposed to few activities (Ms = 3.85 vs. 4.92), F(1, 79) = 3.34, p = .071.  
No other reliable effect emerged, Fs<1.  In line with the hypothesis these results suggest 
that managers, but not subordinates, were guided by the experienced ease of retrieval. 
Mood 
We first collapsed the four mood-items into a single score (α = .86, M = .71, SD = 
1.17), which we then subjected to a 2 (power: managers vs. subordinates) x 2 (number of 
instances: few vs. many instances) between subjects analysis of variance.  No reliable 
effects emerged, ps ≥ .196.  This suggests that mood does not underlie the effects reported 
in the present study.   
Taken together these findings contribute to the generality of our claim that power 
induces reliance on experiential information.  We found that managers, who occupied 
naturally occurring powerful positions, relied on the experienced ease associated with the 
retrieval of mental contents.  In contrast, a comparable group of employees in subordinate 
positions was unaffected by this experiential information.  These results are noteworthy as 
very little research has examined the effects of power in individuals who occupy real-life 
powerful and powerless positions.   
 Power and Subjective Experiences 22 
 
 
Overall these findings point out that power increases reliance on subjective 
experiences not only in unfamiliar attitude-judgments (Study 1a) but also in familiar 
judgments related to the Self (Study 2).  The next study examines judgments related to 
social targets. 
Study 3: Social Perception 
Following the same logic, we aimed at extending our findings into social 
perception and stereotyping, a topic that has traditionally attracted a great deal of research 
on power (e.g., Chen et al., 2001; Chen, Ybarra, & Kiefer, 2004; Dépret & Fiske, 1999; 
Fiske, 1993; Goodwin et al., 2000; Goodwin, Operario, & Fiske, 1998; Guinote et al., 
2002; Overbeck & Park, 2001; Overbeck & Park, 2006;  Richeson & Ambady, 2002; 
Stevens & Fiske, 2000; Vescio, Snyder, & Butz, 2003; Vescio, Gervais, Snyder & 
Hoover, 2005).  It is widely assumed that power promotes stereotyping and reliance on 
prior knowledge (see Fiske, 1993; Fiske & Dépret, 1996; Goodwin et al., 2000; Keltner, et 
al. 2003; Keltner & Robinson, 1997; Rodriguez-Bailon, Moya, & Yzerbyt, 2000).  For 
example, in an extensive line of research Fiske and her colleagues (Fiske, 1993; Fiske & 
Dépret, 1996; Goodwin et al., 2000) found that powerful individuals attend more to 
stereotype consistent information of social targets compared to stereotype inconsistent 
information, whereas powerless individuals attend also to stereotype inconsistent 
information.   
However, recent findings indicate that powerful individuals are capable of 
individuating their subordinates.  Overbeck and Park (2001) found that powerful 
individuals, compared to powerless individuals, better remembered individuating 
information of their interaction partners that was relevant for the task at hand.  Similarly, 
Vescio and her colleagues (2003) found that powerful individuals only used stereotypes 
about their subordinates when stereotypes were relevant to the context (e.g., women in 
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masculine domains) and informed their social influence strategies.  Powerful individuals, 
therefore, seem to have more malleable social perceptions than previously considered.  
They may individuate others depending on the relevance of individuating information for 
the goals that they pursue (Overbeck & Park, 2006; see also Guinote, 2007-e) and their 
social influence strategies (Vescio et al., 2003).   
This previous research has examined contexts in which social perception was 
instrumental to the exercise of power.  One question that arises is whether the social 
judgments of powerful individuals can also be affected by momentary influences that are 
unrelated to the exercise of power.  In the present study we examine how momentary 
influences that derive from subjective experiences affect the social perception of powerful 
and powerless individuals.  We hypothesized that powerful individuals will rely more on 
stereotypes when experiential information is consistent with stereotypes.  However, they 
will rely less on stereotypes when subjective experiences contradict stereotypes.   
We used gender groups as the target categories.  Gender is a basic social category, 
whose representation is well-established and developed at a very young age (e.g., 
Powlishta, 1995; Yee & Brown, 1994; see also Jost & Kay, 2005).  Our claim that 
powerful individuals rely more on subjective experiences is particularly supported if we 
can show that these effects occur even for well-established stereotypes.   
Participants were asked to generate many or few characteristics on which they felt 
men and women are, on average, different (see Dijksterhuis et al., 1999).  When it was 
easy to retrieve differences between men and women we expected powerful participants, 
more than powerless participants, to perceive the two gender groups in stereotypic ways.  
However, when it was difficult to retrieve differences between men and women we 
expected powerful participants to perceive the gender groups in less stereotypic ways 
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compared to powerless participants.  In the present study power was operationalized using 
a priming manipulation, similarly to Study 1a. 
Method 
Participants and Design 
One-hundred and thirty-two students (84 females and 48 males) from the 
University of Kent participated in this study.  A draw with four prizes was offered in 
return for participation.  Participants were randomly assigned to the 2 (power: powerful 
vs. powerless) x 2 (number of differences: few vs. many) experimental conditions.   
Procedure and Materials 
Up to six participants took part in one session.  Upon arrival participants were 
informed that they would participate in three separate studies, the first study allegedly 
being concerned with situational perception and the remaining two studies investigating 
group perception.  Separate questionnaires numbered from one to three, as well as 
coversheets in differing color, aimed at bolstering this cover-story.  Participants were 
instructed to work through the questionnaires in the order presented to them.  The power-
manipulation was included in the first questionnaire and was the same as in Study 1a.  
This was followed by the manipulation of ease of retrieval.  Participants were asked to list 
either two or twelve attributes on which they thought women and men are, on average, 
different.  This manipulation was adopted from Dijksterhuis et al.  (1999).  The instruction 
read as follows: 
In this study we are interested in your perception of characteristics that members 
of different groups possess.  In particular, we are interested in gender groups and 
attributes that differentiate men and women.  We would like you to think about 
differences between men and women.  In the space below please list two (twelve) 
traits/personality-characteristics on which you think women and men are, on 
average, different.   
 
The final questionnaire assessed the dependent variables.  A first measure of 
typicality asked participants to indicate how well twelve gender-typed attributes describe 
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men and women on a scale ranging from not at all (1) to very well (9).  Attributes were 
chosen based on previous research (Bem, 1976; Spence, Helmreich & Holohan, 1979; 
Williams & Best, 1982).  Masculine attributes were courageous, assertive, self-confident, 
rude, boastful, and autocratic; female attributes were warm, sympathetic, gentle, nagging, 
whiny, and fussy.  Participants indicated how well each of the attributes described the two 
target-groups.  They also estimated the percentage of women and men possessing each of 
the twelve attributes (see Park & Judd, 1990).  Finally, mood was measured using the 
same scales employed in Study 2.   
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Checks 
Participants in the high-power condition reported that they felt more in charge (Ms 
= 6.98 vs. 2.70), t(129) = 15.09, p <.001, indicating that the manipulation of power was 
effective.  Participants also indicated their experienced ease or difficulty in generating the 
requested number of attributes on a 9-point scale.  Scores were subjected to a 2 (power: 
powerful vs. powerless) x 2 (number of traits: few vs. many traits) between subjects 
analysis of variance.  This analysis indicated that generating few differences was 
perceived easier than generating many differences between men and women (Ms = 4.84 
vs. 3.30), F(1, 128) = 14.98, p < .001.  No other effects were significant, Fs<1. 
Stereotyping 
Stereotypicality.  We computed an index of stereotypicality by subtracting ratings 
given on counter-stereotypic traits from ratings given on stereotypic traits for each target 
group separately.  We then submitted this index to a 2 (power: powerful vs. powerless) x 2 
(number-of-traits: few vs. many traits) x 2 (participant gender: male vs. female) x 2 (target 
gender: men vs. women) mixed analysis of variance with target as within subjects factor.  
The analysis revealed the expected significant interaction between power and number of 
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stereotypic traits generated, F(1, 124) = 8.21, p = .005.  As shown in Table 3, powerful 
participants stereotyped both target groups more after having retrieved few as opposed to 
many stereotypic traits (Ms = 2.09 vs. 1.62), F(1, 124) = 4.43, p = .037.  Conversely, 
powerless participants tended to stereotype more after retrieving many rather than few 
stereotypic traits (Ms = 1.44 vs. 1.91), F(1, 124) = 3.81, p = .053.  Furthermore, there was 
a main effect of target gender such that men were perceived in more stereotypic ways than 
women (Ms = 1.95 vs. 1.58), F(1, 124) = 5.87, p = .017.  A marginal significant 
interaction between power, number of arguments, and target gender suggests that the 
effects of power on ease of retrieval were somewhat stronger for male compared to female 
gender stereotypes, F(1, 124) = 3.58, p = .061.7 Finally, an interaction between power and 
participant gender indicates that males had more stereotypic perceptions than females 
when primed with powerlessness (Ms = 2.14 vs. 1.46), but not when primed with power 
(Ms = 1.73 vs. 1.93), F(1, 124) = 6.22, p = .014.  No other effects were significant, ps ≥ 
.173.  In particular powerful participants did not rely more on stereotypes than powerless 
participants, F < 1.   
Percentage-Estimates.  The percentage estimates given on counter-stereotypic 
traits were subtracted from the percentage estimates given on stereotypic traits for each 
target group separately.  We then submitted this index to a 2 (power: powerful vs. 
powerless) x 2 (number of traits: few vs. many traits) x 2 (participant gender: male vs. 
female) x 2 (target gender: men vs. women) mixed analysis of variance with target as 
within subjects factor.  The results yielded the predicted interaction between power and 
number of stereotypic attributes retrieved, F(1, 124) = 6.22, p = .014.  As can be seen in 
Table 3, powerful participants tended to stereotype more after having retrieved few as 
opposed to many stereotypic traits (Ms = 25.83% vs. 18.96%), F(1, 124) = 3.54, p = .062, 
whereas the opposite tendency was evident for powerless participants (Ms = 16.48% vs. 
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21.04%), F(1, 124) = 2.73, p = .101.  Furthermore, there was an interaction between 
number of arguments and target gender, F(1, 124) = 3.58, p = .061; as well as an 
interaction between power and participant gender, indicating that male participants 
stereotyped more than female participants when primed with powerlessness (Ms = 22.74% 
vs. 19.01%), but not when primed with power (Ms = 19.40% vs. 21.88%), F(1, 124) = 
6.22, p = .014.7  No other effects were significant, ps ≥ .151.  In particular, power did not 
increase stereotyping independent of ease of retrieval experiences, F< 1. 
Mood.  Answers to the four items were collapsed into a single index (α = .79, M = 
.65, SD = 1.20) and entered into a 2 (power: powerful vs. powerless) x 2 (number of 
attributes: few vs. many attributes) between subjects analysis of variance, which revealed 
no significant effects, Fs<1.  This suggests that mood does not underlie the effects of 
power reported in the present study. 
Taken together the results of the present study indicate that power promoted 
stereotyping only when generating stereotypic information was easy.  When retrieving 
stereotypic information was difficult power lessened stereotypic gender-perceptions.  No 
support was found for an overall link between power and stereotyping.  In line with the 
findings obtained for attitudes and self-related judgments, the present data suggest that 
also the social perception of powerful individuals is highly flexible and depends on 
experiential information that accompanies judgmental processes.   
Study 3 extended our previous studies to judgments made in relation to social 
targets.  We conducted a final study to demonstrate that ease of retrieval experiences can 
have more enduring effects, thereby contributing to some attitudinal stability.   
Study 4: Ease of Retrieval and Attitude Stability 
Past research has emphasized the greater idiosyncrasy (Chen et al., 2001) and 
stability of powerful individuals (e.g., Anderson & Berdahl, 2002).  The present research 
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emphasizes the greater context-dependence and flexibility that derives from the 
experience of power.  Those two perspectives are, however, not necessarily contradictory.  
Some contexts may habitually trigger the emergence of an individual’s more chronic 
personal tendencies (e.g., Chen et al., 2001), and be conducive of some stability in 
judgments over time.   
Moreover, evaluative judgments can be stored in memory and retrieved later in 
subsequent evaluations related to the same target (Judd & Brauer, 1995; see also Schwarz 
& Bohner, 2001; Wilson & Hodges, 1992).  Likewise experiential information may be 
stored in memory (see Barsalou, 1999).  We hypothesized, therefore, that these sources of 
information stored in memory may contribute to some temporal stability of the initial 
effects of ease of retrieval.  To test this hypothesis participants made evaluative judgments 
twice: immediately after a manipulation of ease of retrieval, and after one week.  We 
predicted that the effects of our initial manipulation of ease of retrieval would be still 
evident after one week.   
In the present study the target of judgments was participants’ attitudes towards a 
controversial topic: the introduction of biometric ID cards.  We asked participants to 
indicate their attitudes towards the introduction of new ID cards immediately after the 
manipulation of ease of retrieval and one week later.  The present study used trait 
dominance as a proxy for power (see Anderson & Berdahl, 2002; Goodwin et al., 1998; 
Operario & Fiske, 2001).  Since our previous studies did not include a control group this 
approach has the advantage to allow for a test of a linear relationship between power and 
reliance on the ease of retrieval.  Similarly to the previous studies we assessed 
participants’ mood in order to examine whether the effects of dominance are related to 
differences in mood.   
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The present study also tested an additional alternative explanation for the results 
obtained in the previous studies.  The differences in the judgments of powerful and 
powerless individuals may derive from differences in the number of counter-arguments 
generated by these participants during the retrieval process.  To rule out this alternative 
explanation participants were asked to list all thoughts they had while generating 
arguments (see Greenwald, 1968; Maheswaran & Chaiken, 1991).   
Method 
Participants and Design 
One hundred and twenty-eight students (86 female and 42 male) from the 
University of Kent participated for course credits.  The study measured trait dominance 
and assigned participants randomly to the ease of retrieval conditions (number of 
arguments: few vs. many arguments).   One week later participants completed the same 
dependent measures as in Time 1 (T1).   
Procedure and Materials 
Trait dominance scores were obtained from a mass-test at the beginning of the 
academic year, using the Revised Interpersonal Adjective Scale (IAS-R; Wiggins, 
Trapnell, & Phillips, 1988).  The scale consists of eight adjectives (e.g., firm, assertive), 
which were embedded in filler-items.  Participants rated how accurately the adjectives 
described them on an 8-point scale ranging from 1 (extremely inaccurate) to 8 (extremely 
accurate).   
Upon arrival to the experiment, participants learned that they would be involved in 
two separate studies, the first being concerned with the design of a larger survey, and the 
second with the validation of scales.  Participants were asked to complete a booklet that 
contained all experimental materials.  To reinforce the cover-story the booklet consisted 
of two different parts, separated with colored sheets.  The first part manipulated ease of 
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retrieval asking participants to generate arguments in favor of introducing biometric ID 
cards.  The second part contained the dependent measures.  Participants were informed 
that the study examines people’s views about current issues and that their answers will 
help to design a questionnaire for a later survey.  Participants were asked to read the 
following information carefully: 
Recently the government launched an ID card bill.  This bill pushes for the 
introduction of a national identity card, which presents one component of the 
government’s legislative plan that puts an emphasis on security measures.  The 
new ID cards contain biometric information stored on a microchip.  This includes 
fingerprints, facial scans and iris scans, all of which are unique to each individual.  
A national database would be created holding personal information such as names, 
addresses, and biometric information for all cardholders.  The scheme elicited 
much controversial reactions. 
 
After reading this information participants were asked to generate either three 
arguments or seven arguments in favor of the new identity card.  The number of 
arguments was chosen based on a pre-test in which participants (N = 20) were asked to 
generate as many distinct arguments as they could think of (M = 4.45, SD = 1.50).  After 
generating the arguments participants in the main study responded to two items measuring 
their attitudes towards the new biometric ID cards.  The first item asked participants to 
indicate their attitude towards the new IDs (1 negative to 9 positive), and the second item 
assessed how much participants would welcome the introduction of the new ID cards (1 
not at all to 9 very much).  Participants also indicated their current mood on four 7-point 
scales, –3 (very bad; very sad; very discontent; very tense) to 3 (very good; very happy, 
very content; very relaxed).  A subsequent thought-listing task instructed participants to 
list any thoughts they had while they were generating their arguments in favor of the new 
ID cards.  Participants received a separate sheet for each argument, and were instructed to 
write each distinct thought they had on a separate line.  For each argument participants 
could write down up to five thoughts.  They were assured that any thought was of 
relevance, and that there were no right or wrong answers.   
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A questionnaire was sent to participants after one week had elapsed, asking them 
to rate their attitudes towards the introduction of the biometric ID card on the same rating 
scales used in T1.  Ninety participants (70.31%) replied to this follow-up questionnaire.  
A written debrief was subsequently emailed to all participants involved in the study.   
Results and Discussion 
Manipulation Check 
A manipulation check asked participants to indicate how easy or difficult it was 
for them to generate the requested number of arguments, on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 
(very easy) to 9 (very difficult).  Scores were reverse coded and subjected to an 
independent t-test, which confirmed that generating three arguments was indeed perceived 
to be easier than generating seven arguments (Ms = 4.72 vs. 3.59), t(126) = 3.13, p = .002. 
Attitudes at Time 1  
The eight items of the dominance scale were first combined into a single score (α 
= .83; M = 4.87, SD = .1.07).  The two items measuring attitudes at T1 were highly 
correlated and also collapsed to form a single score for participants’ attitudes (α = .98; M 
= 5.20; SD = 2.17).  The standardized dominance scores, number of arguments, as well as 
the interaction term of those two variables were entered as predictors of participants’ 
attitude score (see Aiken & West, 1991).  This analysis yielded a significant main effect 
of dominance, ß = .19, p = .029.  The more dominant participants were, the more they 
welcomed the new ID cards.  More importantly, the expected interaction between trait 
dominance and number of arguments was significant, ß = -.20, p = .021.  As can be seen 
in the top panel of Figure 1, generating few arguments resulted in a more favorable 
attitude than generating many arguments for participants high in dominance (+1SD: Ms =  
5.82 vs. 5.38), whereas the opposite tendency was evident for participants low in trait 
dominance (-1SD: Ms = 4.54 vs. 4.99).  There was no main effect of number of 
 Power and Subjective Experiences 32 
 
 
arguments, t<1.  The variance explained by the model (7.4%) was significant, F(3, 124) = 
3.32, p = .022.  In sum, paralleling the findings obtained in the previous studies, the 
results indicate that trait dominance moderates reliance on the ease of retrieval.  The more 
participants were dominant, the more they were influenced by the experienced ease of 
retrieval.  Conversely, the less participants were dominant, the more they drew on the 
content of the information they retrieved.   
Attitudes at Time 2  
Thirty percent of participants did not reply to the Time 2 (T2) measures.  This 
dropout was, however, independent of experimental conditions, χ2(N = 128) = .77, ns, and 
of  T1-attitudes towards the biometric ID cards, t(126) = .45, ns.  Responses were, 
however, related to participants’ dominance scores, t(126) = 2.03, p = .044.  Somewhat 
surprisingly, respondents were on average more dominant than non-respondents (Ms= 
4.97 vs. 4.55).  Importantly for our purpose, this dropout is unlikely to have produced a 
biasing effect on the key interaction between dominance and ease of retrieval.   
We first examined the relationship between T1 and T2 attitudes.  Participants’ 
evaluations of the ID cards were highly correlated (r(89) = .88, p < .001), and this 
association did not vary as a function of dominance, r(89) = -.06, ns.  This result indicates 
that attitudes were stable over time.  We then regressed participants’ dominance scores, 
number of arguments, as well as the corresponding interaction term onto the combined 
T2-attitude scores (α = .97; M = 5.18; SD = 2.05).  The analysis revealed that the 
interaction between trait dominance and number of arguments was significant, ß = -.28, p 
= .008, which is illustrated in the bottom panel of Figure 1.  This indicates that the effect 
of the initial manipulation of ease of retrieval was still evident after one week had elapsed.  
No other significant effects were found, ts<1.  The variance explained by the model 
(8.4%) approached statistical significance, F(3, 86) = 2.64, p = .054.   
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Taken together these results are consistent with the hypothesis that dominant 
individuals rely more on ease of retrieval, and that ease of retrieval can affect attitudes 
outside the context in which it was initially operating.  The effects of the experimental 
manipulation of ease of retrieval were still evident after one week had elapsed, 
demonstrating that subjective experiences can have enduring effects. 
Mood.   
The four items assessing mood were highly correlated and collapsed into a single 
index (α = .88; M = .83; SD = 1.12).  An initial correlation analysis revealed a positive 
association between dominance and elevated mood, r(127) = .31, p < .001.  Dominant 
participants were in a better mood than non-dominant participants.  However, when we 
controlled for the effects of mood, the joint effect of trait dominance and number of 
arguments on attitudes remained significant (T1: ß = -.25, p = .008; T2: ß = -.30, p = 
.008).  These results exclude, therefore, the possibility that mood mediated the effects of 
dominance on reliance on ease of retrieval (cf.  Kenny, Kashy, & Bolger, 1998).   
Counter-Attitudinal Thoughts 
We examined the number of counter-arguments generated during the thought 
listing task.  Specifically, for each participant the total number of supportive, opposing, 
and neutral (unrelated or indifferent) thoughts were counted.  Reliability was established 
by having a second rater code 2/3 of the total sample (α = .96).  We computed an index of 
counter-attitudinal thought-bias by subtracting for each participant the total number of 
opposing thoughts from the total number of supportive thoughts.  Trait dominance, 
number of arguments, as well as the interaction term between these two factors were then 
regressed on this index.  The results indicate that number of arguments had a significant 
effect on thought-bias, ß = .20, p = .025.  Participants had relatively more positive 
thoughts when they generated many as opposed to few arguments.  No other effects were 
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significant (ts<1), which suggests that differences in the number of counter-attitudinal 
thoughts cannot account for the relationship between dominance and reliance on the ease 
of retrieval.     
Taken together these results are consistent with the previous studies indicating that 
powerful individuals relied more on ease of retrieval compared to powerless individuals.  
Furthermore, the present study demonstrated that ease of retrieval can have more enduring 
effects than previously considered.  Reliance on the ease of retrieval does not preclude 
some temporal stability of the judgments and attitudes of powerful individuals.   
Moreover, examining power from an individual-difference perspective allowed us 
to confirm a linear relationship between power and reliance on ease of retrieval 
experiences.  Finally, the present study contributed to rule out alternative explanations for 
ease of retrieval effects.  Study 1b indicated that variations in the persuasiveness of the 
generated arguments cannot account for the effects of power.  The present study further 
demonstrates that differences in the number of counter-attitudinal arguments generated 
during the retrieval process can also not account for the results.  Consistent with the 
previous studies, the effects obtained were independent of mood.  The results are best 
interpreted in terms of direct effects of power on reliance on ease of retrieval. 
General Discussion 
The present article examined the effects of power on reliance on experiential 
information.  Thereby our focus was the experienced ease or difficulty associated with the 
retrieval of mental contents.  Based on the assumption derived from the Situated Focus 
Theory of Power that power promotes reliance on the primary factors that drive cognition 
(Guinote, in press) and that the ease of retrieval usually guides judgment (Kahneman, 
2003; see also Menon & Raghubir, 2003; Pam et al., 2001), we hypothesized that 
powerful individuals, more than powerless individuals, rely on the ease of retrieval.   
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Using a variety of operationalizations of power, and investigating different 
domains such as attitude-judgments towards irrelevant (Study 1a) or relevant targets 
(Study 4), self-related judgments (Study 2), and stereotypes (Study 3), we consistently 
found that power promotes reliance on ease of retrieval experiences.  The judgments of 
powerful participants were more in line with the content of the retrieved information when 
retrieval was easy, compared to when retrieval was difficult.  Conversely, the judgments 
of powerless participants were not affected by experiential information and tended to be 
based on the content of the retrieved information.   
Compared to the results of powerless individuals, the results of powerful 
individuals are closer to the results usually obtained with the ease of retrieval paradigm 
(e.g., Schwarz et al., 1991).  One could think that the effects reported in this article are 
mainly driven by powerlessness rather than by power.  We believe, however, that power 
has linear effects on reliance on ease of retrieval.  This assumption is supported by Study 
4: Using trait dominance as a proxy for power we found a linear relationship between 
power and reliance on the ease of retrieval.  That is, the more individuals usually exerted 
power, the more their judgments were likely to be guided by experiential information.  
Conversely, the more individuals were submissive, the more they were prone to draw on 
additional sources of information to inform their judgments.   
Throughout the various studies we made an effort to rule out alternative 
explanations for the effects obtained.  Some authors argue that power induces positive 
mood (Keltner et al., 2003).  It has also been shown that mood increases reliance on ease 
of retrieval (Ruder & Bless, 2003).  Therefore, we examined whether power affected 
mood and this in turn explained differences in reliance on the ease of retrieval.  
Consistently across all studies mood did not account for the results obtained.  Mood and 
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power have therefore independent effects on the extent to which individuals rely on the 
ease of retrieval.   
An additional alternative explanation pertains to differences in the content of the 
information retrieved by powerful and powerless participants across the two levels of ease 
of retrieval.  Specifically, it is conceivable that the persuasiveness, the valence of the 
information retrieved, or the number of counter-arguments generated varied more as a 
function of the amount of information retrieved for powerful compared to powerless 
individuals.  Using external observers (Study 1b) as well as a thought-listing task (Study 
4) we could, however, not find support for these mechanisms.   
Another alternative explanation pertains to differences in processing motivation 
and effort.  Powerful individuals may be less motivated to process information, and 
therefore rely on subjective experiences (see Aarts & Dijksterhuis, 1999; Rothman & 
Schwarz, 1998).  Although we argue that powerful individuals rely on those aspects that 
are primary in a given situation (see Guinote, in press), we believe that these effects are 
independent of effort.  In other words, power affects what information individuals process 
but not necessarily the effort involved in processing (see Guinote, in 2007-b; in press).   
Several findings contradict an explanation in terms of effort: Participants primed 
with power generated higher quality arguments than participants primed with 
powerlessness (Study 1a-b).  Moreover, the instances retrieved by powerful and powerless 
participants were similar on a number of criteria, for example, time involved in the 
activities reported (Study 2), and number of counter-arguments generated (Study 4).  
Finally, the results obtained do not seem to derive from differences in the effects of our 
manipulation of ease of retrieval, as indicated by our manipulation checks.  Taken 
together, these results suggest that power directly increased reliance on ease of retrieval.   
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Implications of the Present Findings 
The present findings rectify an important neglect in past research on power, 
demonstrating that a full account of the effects of power needs to consider subjective 
experiences.  Taking into account subjective experiences leads to different predictions, 
qualifying and often reversing the predictions made on the basis of declarative thought-
contents (see Schwarz, 1998).  Furthermore, the present findings highlight that power 
promotes malleable responses, construed in the situation on the basis of momentary 
experiences individuals have.  These findings have consequences for several domains. 
Power and the Self: Researchers have argued that power promotes responses in line with 
dispositions of the person (Chen et al., 2001; see also Smith & Trope, 2006).  In contrast, 
the present findings demonstrate that the self-related judgments of powerful individuals 
are subject to temporary influences of subjective experiences and, therefore, more 
malleable than it has previously been considered.   
Nevertheless, in line with the Situated Focus Theory of Power (Guinote, in press) 
we believe that power induces a selective processing of information.  We believe, 
therefore, that power can magnify the expression of person variables, but only in situations 
where those chronic person constructs are the primary factors that drive cognition (see 
Higgins, 1996; Higgins, King, & Mavin, 1982). 
Power and Stereotyping: A great deal of past research on power has focused on social 
perception (e.g., Chen, et al. 2001; Chen et al., 2004; Dépret & Fiske, 1999; Fiske, 1993; 
Goodwin et al., 19998; Goodwin et al., 2000; Gubin et al., 2000; Guinote et al., 2002; 
Overbeck & Park, 2001; Overbeck & Park, 2006; Richeson & Ambady, 2002; Stevens & 
Fiske, 2000; Vescio et al., 2003; Vescio et al., 2005).  This work was based on the effects 
of declarative information on stereotyping.   
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Previous research has shown that power promotes stereotypic social perceptions 
when stereotype-consistent information is present in the environment (e.g., Fiske, 1993; 
Fiske & Dépret, 1996), and when stereotypes are instrumental to the person’s current 
goals (Overbeck & Park, 2006; Vescio et al., 2003, see also Guinote, 2007-e).  The present 
findings provide an important extension, showing that in the absence of external cues or 
processing objectives power can promote both individuation and stereotypic perceptions 
depending on momentary experiences.   
Power and Behavior Variability: Past research found that powerful groups are perceived 
as more variable than powerless groups (Guinote, 2001; see also Lorenzo-Cioldi, 1993; 
Simon & Brown, 1987).  This occurs in part because powerful individuals act objectively 
in more variable ways compared to powerless individuals (Guinote et al., 2002).   
To demonstrate this phenomenon, Guinote and her colleagues assigned 
participants randomly to powerful and powerless groups, and videotaped them while 
working on different tasks.  Subsequently, observers, who were unaware of the power 
relations between the groups, rated each group member along several personality traits.  
Observers rated the members of powerful groups as more variable from one another than 
the members of powerless groups.  Power increased, therefore, interpersonal behavior 
variability.  Since subjective experiences vary across individuals reliance on these 
experiences may contribute to greater interpersonal variability in the judgments and 
behavior of powerful compared to powerless individuals.  Furthermore, since subjective 
experiences also vary within individuals, reliance on subjective experiences may also 
induce greater intrapersonal variability in powerful compared to powerless individuals. 
Attitudes and Subjective Experiences: The present findings not only indicate that the 
attitudes of powerful individuals are dependent on subjective experiences, but they also 
have implications for the understanding of ease of retrieval.  We hypothesized, as far as 
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we know for the first time, that attitudes that are formed based on ease of retrieval can be 
stable over time.  Although attitudes are often construed in the situation based on cues that 
are temporarily accessible (e.g., Schwarz & Bohner, 2001), individuals can rely on past 
evaluations stored in memory to construe their judgments (see Judd & Brauer, 1995).  
Therefore, we reasoned that the initial judgments and possibly the ease or difficulty in 
retrieving information (see Barsalou, 1999) can be stored in memory and affect later 
judgments, thereby resulting in some stability over time.  The results of Study 4 supported 
this hypothesis.   
The finding that power moderates ease of retrieval is also important for our 
understanding of attitudes and attitude formation.  Research has largely focused on 
contextual variables (e.g., Lerner & Gonzales, 2005; Ruder & Bless, 2003) and 
characteristics of the target (e.g., Gawronski, Bodenhausen, & Banse, 2005; Rothman & 
Hardin, 1997) that affect reliance on the ease of retrieval.  The present findings indicate 
that structural variables associated with the extent to which individuals control outcomes, 
as well as dispositional variables associated with the tendency to dominate and influence 
others, affect the extent to which individuals rely on the ease of retrieval. 
Conclusion 
The present research points out that an understanding of the effects of power 
requires a consideration of experiential information.  Power promotes reliance on 
subjective experiences independently of factors such as motivation, persuasiveness, 
thought contents, and mood.  Taking into account experiential knowledge leads to 
differential predictions of the effects of power than those commonly considered in the 
literature.  This highlights the flexibility of powerful individuals’ attitudes and 
perceptions.  
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Footnotes 
1 
A large number of arguments can be more favorable towards the attitude object 
compared to a small number of arguments (e.g.  Ruder & Bless, 2003).  However, 
empirical evidence indicates that this is not necessarily always the case (see Haddock, 
2000; Tormala, Pretty, & Brinol, 2002).   
2 
Two participants did not indicate their gender in the questionnaire. 
3
 See Wilson, Wheatley, Meyers, Gilbert, and Axsom (2000) for a discussion of a single 
item mood measure. 
4 Across studies tests of simple effects were conducted using Fisher’s least significant 
difference (LSD) test, which requires a significant higher order interaction (see Howell, 
1995).  In Study 1b simple effects were still significant after Bonferroni correction to 
adjust the familywise error rate for the number of comparisons made (α’ = .05/4 = .0125).  
 
5 
Eight managers (18.2%) and eleven subordinates (28.2%) did not indicate their current 
job-level. 
6
 We also examined the role of age and gender.  There was a tendency for age to be 
positively related to leisure time satisfaction, r(79) = .21, p = .066.  Moreover, women 
reported lower levels of satisfaction than men (Ms = 3.71 vs.  4.66), F(1, 81) = 4.27, p = 
.042.  However, participant age and gender did not have other effects (all ps ≥ .156).  
Therefore, these factors were dropped from further analyses.   
7
 These were unpredicted effects and, therefore, prone to Type 1 error inflation (e.g., 
Howell, 1995).  After Bonferroni-correction to adjust alpha for the total number of 
possible comparisons between means none of the unpredicted effects remains significant 
(ps > .0017).   
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Table 1.  Attitudes as a function of power and number of arguments retrieved (writers; 
Study 1a) or arguments studied (readers; Study 1b).   
  
 Writers Readers 
Number of arguments: few  many few many  
Power:     
Powerful     
M 6.97 4.88 6.27 6.38 
SD 2.29 2.70 2.18 2.00 
Powerless     
M 5.77 5.36 6.32 6.26 
SD 2.31 2.41 2.29 2.31 
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Table 2.  Satisfaction with leisure time as a function of organizational power and number 
of instances retrieved (Study 2). 
 
Number of instances: few  many  
Position:   
Manager   
M 4.95 3.82 
SD 1.77 1.88 
Subordinates   
M 3.85 4.92 
SD 1.99 1.64 
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Table 3.  Gender stereotyping as a function of power and number of stereotypic attributes 
retrieved (Study 3). 
 
Stereotyping: Typicality Percentage-Estimates 
Number of arguments: few  many few many 
Power:     
Powerful     
M 2.09 1.62 25.83 18.96 
SD 1.10 .86 15.98 10.23 
Powerless     
M 1.44 1.91 16.48 21.04 
SD .85 1.08 10.07 13.66 
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Figure 1.  Attitudes towards the introduction of new biometric ID cards as a function of 
trait dominance and number of arguments (Study 4).  Top panel: attitudes at Time 1; 
bottom panel: attitudes at Time 2.  Note: Higher numbers indicate a more favorable 
attitude. 
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